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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

CaseNo.20110176-CA

PHILLIP J. FRANCIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
Appeal from a conviction for Burglary, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 in the Second District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable
Michael Direda, Judge, presiding.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erroneously determined that a church constituted a
dwelling for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
"An appellate court reviews a trial court's statutory interpretation for correctness,
according no deference," State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Defense counsel argued that the offense did not meet the second-degree felony
requirement because it occurred at a church and not at a dwelling. R. 50:123-28.
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This appeal is governed by U.S. Const. Amend. V and XIV, Utah Const. Art. I §•§.
2, 7; Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-201; 76-6-202.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 28, 2010, the State filed an information charging Mr. Francis with
burglary. R. 2. On February 8, 2011, the case was tried to the bench with a verdict of
guilty. R. 50:145. The defendant was sentenced the same day as trial, February 8, 2011.
R. 50:146-59. The judgment was entered on February 10, 2011. R. 31. OnFebruary 23,
2011, the defendant filed a notice of appeal to this Court. R. 42.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
a*

Testimony of Guadalupe Camacho

On June 25, 2010, Guadalupe Camacho was asleep at the Hispanic Pentecostal
Church in Ogden, Utah. R. 50:25-26, 53. Ms. Camacho slept at the church, in a separated
section in the basement, since part of her duties were to maintain and care for the church.
Id. She testified that there were stairs to her bedroom, but that they were in a different
part of the building and that parishioners did not come to her bedroom. Id. at 45. She
woke to noises upstairs, and since she was scared, she called both the police and several
church leaders. Id. at 27-29. She never saw or heard a person come into the basement, but
only heard noises upstairs in the church. Id. at 45. The police eventually called her and
she left her bedroom to see police officers and the pastor there. Id. at 29-30. She noticed
that the door of the sanctuary, where they had church services, was open. Id. at 34. Then
2
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she saw Mr. Francis behind her and then the police arrested him. Id, at 34-35. Mr. Francis
was wearing gloves. Id. at 47. She testified that two of the windows had been opened
about 18 to 24 inches and that something had happened to the lights so that they would
not go off. Id. at 35-38. Outside the next morning, she located a tool that plumbers would
use, a hammer on the cooler and a flashlight inside. Id. at 38, 40-41. She also believed
that a window was damaged from a piece of broken wood. Id. at 42. She had seen Mr.
Francis before at the church. Id. She acknowledged that nothing had been stolen or was
missing. Id. at 47.
b.

Testimony of Frank Narvaez

Frank Narvaez was the pastor of the church. Id. at 5 3. He said the church took
donations for food and that they also donated food on Saturdays in the summer. Id. at 54,
81. Food was prepared in a common kitchen shared by both the parishioners and Ms.
Camacho. Id. at 55-56, 69, 85-87. Ms. Camacho also used the women's restroom in the
basement. Id. at 86. Ms. Camacho cleaned the church and mowed its lawn. Id. at 86. The
pastor said the church was also her "home." Id. at 86. Ms. Camacho had her privacy from
others and could lock her door from the inside, but the pastor characterized the building
as a church. Id. at 87, 88. The church was officially registered and held meetings
Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays. Id. at 82. The upstairs of the
church had a sanctuary with benches a pulpit and instruments, as well as classrooms for
Bible study and an office. Id. at 56-58, 82. As one walked into the church, one could go
downstairs to the kitchen and bathrooms, or to go upstairs for the church. Id. at 63, 90.
3
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The area where Ms. Camacho lived was not used in any way for church functions. Id. at
.82-83. •/••"••'/';'•
He received a call from Ms. Camacho and he left home to come to the church. Id.
at 59-60. When he arrived, the police were there. Id. at 60. He unlocked the door for the
police and called out to Ms. Camacho, who finally peeked out of her bedroom on the
third call. Id. at 61-62. Ms. Camacho pointed the officers and Mr. Narvaez to where the
noises were coming from. Id. at 64. Ms. Camacho pointed out that the sanctuary's door
had been opened. Id. at 65.
As they begin to walk toward the sanctuary, an officer yelled, "Hey, freeze"
toward the room where clothing donations were kept. Id. at 65-66. Mr. Francis was in the
room. Id. at 70. The pastor had known Mr. Francis for about a month and a half from
various church meetings. Id. at 71. The pastor suspected, but did not know for sure, that
Mr. Francis had stolen from the church before. Id. at 71-74, 80-81. The officers moved
Mr. Francis to a foyer area and officers took black gloves from him. Id. at 77, 79.
c.

Testimony of Officer Zachary Martin

Officer Martin responded at around 3 am to the scene and walked around the
church. Id. at 93-95. He noticed two open windows but did not see any lights on or any
movement in the building. Id. at 97, 98. Frank Narvaez pulled up and let the officers into
the building. Id. at 98. The officers started to clear the building.. Id. at 99. Within a minute
or two, in one room, the officer saw several coat racks, and a person's head over the top
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of the racks. Id. at 101, 103. The officers tackled the person, who turned out to be Mr.
Francis. Id. at 101, 105.
Mr. Francis had a coat on and gloves on his hands as well as several sets of latex
gloves in his pocket. Id. at 106-07, 111. The officer opined that thicker gloves could be
used to pry open things and that latex gloves could be used to prevent fingerprints. Id. at
113. At no point did the officer notice any tools that could have been used for a burglary
either in the building or on Mr. Francis. Id. at 109, 110. He looked at the window and it
"didn't look like it had been pried upon" nor were there "any markings ... that I could see
that were different." Id. at 110.
d.

Argument by the Parties

After both parties had rested, defense counsel argued that a church did not meet
the definition of dwelling under the statute. Id. at 123. The court, relying on this Court's
decision in State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, concluded that if the building itself was actually
used as a dwelling, in this case for Ms. Camacho, then the burglary would be committed
in a dwelling for purposes of the statute. Id. at 124-28.
Additionally, defense counsel argued that the evidence was insufficient to show
that Mr. Francis had the intent to commit a crime in the church. Id. at 128-29. Finally,
defense counsel asked the court to consider a finding of guilt on a lesser-included charge
of trespass. Id. at 130.
The court made several findings of fact:
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•

Mr. Francis was inside the structure, that it was locked and that Mr. Francis
lacked permission to be there. Id. at 140.

•

"[M]ost significantly to the Court" was Mr. Francis's possession of latex
gloves. Id. at 141.

•

It did not matter to the court what Mr. Francis might have been there to
take, only that he was in the church without permission. Id. at 142-43.

As to whether Mr. Francis had the intent to commit a crime in the church, the
court said that the latex gloves and tools found at the scene "tilts the Court in favor of
drawing a reasonable inference that you were there will ill motives ..." Id. at 144.
The court concluded that the building was a church, but that it also was a building
usually occupied by a person lodging in the building at night. Id. Important to the court
was the Pastor's characterization of the church as Ms. Camacho's home. Id. at 145. Based
on these findings, the court found Mr. Francis guilty of the second-degree felony
burglary./#.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In order to be convicted for second degree burglary under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6202, a defendant must burglarize a dwelling. The statute, and cases out of this court stand
for the proposition that in order to be a dwelling, a structure must both be the type of
structure that typically houses overnight guests, and it must actually have been occupied
by overnight guests. In this case, although the church was occupied by a full-time
6
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caretaker, the church did not constitute a dwelling under the law, since it is not the type
of structure that typically houses overnight guests. Because of that, the trial court
incorrectly determined that Mr. Francis was guilty of second degree burglary.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT A
CHURCH CONSTITUTES A DWELLING UNDER UTAH CODE
ANN, 76-6-202.

A, The Church Was Not a "Dwelling" For Purposes of the Statute
In order for a person to be convicted of burglary, he must enter or remain
"unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building" with the intent to commit a felony,
theft, assault or other listed offenses. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1). The statute
classifies burglary as a third degree felony, "unless it was committed in a dwelling" in
which case it becomes a second-degree felony. The statute defines "dwelling" as "a
building which is usually occupied by a person lodging in the building at night, whether
or not a person is actually present." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201. Mr. Francis contends
that the church did not fit this definition of dwelling, since overnight residents or guests
do not usually occupy churches.
1. The Common Law Definition of Burglary
At common law, burglary consisted of "the breaking and entering of a dwelling of
another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony." Deadly Force to Arrest;
Triggering Constitutional Review, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 361, 365, n. 34 (emphasis
added).
7
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Sir William Blackstone argued that burglary "has always been looked upon as a
very heinous offence: not only because of the abundant terror that it naturally carries
with it, but also as it is aforcible invasion of that right of habitation, which every
individual might acquire even in a state of nature." Quoted in Theodore E. Lauer,
Burglary in Wyoming, 32 Land & Water L. Rev. 721, 723 (1997) (emphasis added).
Andrew Horn in his, The Mirror ofJustices' (ca. 1320), defined burglary as an offense
"committed not only by breaking a house but on those who are in their own houses with
the intention of reposing therein in peace. The aforesaid assault must be made with intent
to kill, rob or beat those within the house." Id. at 725, quoting Andrew Horn, The Mirror
of Justices 28 (Selden Society ed., vol. 7, 1893) (emphasis added). Sir Edmund Coke's
Institutes of the Laws of England written in 1641, had formulated the common law
definition: "A BURGLAR (or the person that committeth burglary) is by the common
law a felon, that in the night breaketh and entreth in to a mansion house of another, of
intent to kill some reasonable creature, or to commit some other felony within the same,
whether his felonious intent be executed or not." Id. (emphasis added).
Parliament defined the elements of burglary as follows:
To simplify the definition, the basic elements included: (1) the breaking, and (2)
the entry, of (3) the dwelling house, (4)"of another," (5) during the nighttime, and
with (6) felonious intent. These six narrowly defined elements of common law
burglary met the specific needs and purpose for establishing the traditional
offense, which was to protect one's home from intruders when the occupants were
most vulnerable - at night.

8
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Jennifer Lamb Keating, State v. Burdick: Has the South Dakota Supreme Court's
Interpretation of Burglary Gone too Far?, 52 S.D. L. Rev. 210, 221 (2007) (emphasis
added).
At common law, burglary clearly meant to protect people in their homes—in their
dwellings—so that they could rest and sleep in peace. This principle has powerful impact
in the case at hand, since Mr. Francis was accused of burglarizing a building in which
people do not typically sleep.
2. Churches Have Not Been Seen as Dwellings Under Modern Statutes
At common law, breaking into a church was seen to be a burglary because
churches were seen to be homes—the house of God.
Lord Coke said: "If a man do break and enter a church in the night, of intent to
steal... this is burglary, for ecclesia est domus mansionalis omnipotentis Dei." 3
Inst. 64 (1817 Ed.) But William Hawkins, Serjeant at Law, did not agree with
Lord Coke. He said in his Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, 8th Ed. (1824), vol.
l,Ch. 17, p. 133:
"And Sir Edward Coke seems to say, that the breaking a church, &c. is
therefore burglary, because the church is the mansion house of God. But I
can find nothing in the more ancient authors to countenance this nicety; for
the general tenor of the old books seems to be, that burglary may be
committed in breaking houses, or churches, or the walls or gates of a town."
Noting the advisibility of including the word mansionalis in an indictment of
burglary in a house he adds: "But surely it cannot be necessary or proper to have
any such word in an indictment of burglary in a church, which, by all the books
above cited, seems to be taken as a distinct burglary from that in a house." Sir
Matthew Hale, Knt., "some time Lord Chief Justice of the Court of the King's
Bench", was in accord with Hawkins. He observed in his Historia Placitorum
Coronae, 1st American Ed. (1874), Vol. 1, p. 556:

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.'•;..

"Lord Coke says [a church] is the mansion-house of Almighty God, but this
is only a quaint turn without any argument, and seems invented to suit his
definition of burglary, viz. the breaking into a mansion-house, whereas it
appears from Spelman loco supra citato, and 22 Assiz. 95, that it is not
necessary to burglary, that a mansion-house be broken, for the breaking of
churches, the walls or the gates of the city is also burglary, and the word
mansionalis is only applicable to one kind of burglary, viz. the breaking of
a private-house, in which case it must be a dwelling-house."

Sizemore v. Maryland, 272 A.2d 824, 826 (Md. App. 1971). In Sizemore, the defendant
broke into a church and was found inside the church with some stolen property on his
person. Id. at 825. He argued that he could not be found guilty of statutory burglary
because his crime occurred in a church. Id. The court agreed:
It is patent that except under Lord Coke's "quaint turn" a church was not a
dwelling house within the meaning of the common law nor is it a dwelling house
within the meaning we follow today, which is substantially that of the common
law. It is not a building used regularly as a place to sleep.
But a person who breaks a church is not guilty of the statutory burglary ... because
a necessary element of those offenses is that it be a dwelling house that be broken
and a church is not a dwelling house.
Id at 827. See also NY v. Richards, 15 N.E. 371, 372-73 (N.Y. 1888) (tracing the
common law definitions of burglary); Holtman v. Maryland, 278 A.2d 82 (Md. App.
1971) (holding that burglary of a church should have been dismissed because "breaking
into a church was burglary at common law, not on the ground that a church was the
dwelling house of God, but as a separate kind of burglary not involving a dwelling
house").
Other than Lord Coke's "House of God" approach, churches have not been
interpreted to be dwelling houses for purposes of burglary statutes.
10
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3. Utah Law Supports the Argument that a Church is Not a Dwelling
The Utah Supreme Court has commented on Utah's common law tradition
regarding burglary, stating that "[a]t common law, the societal interests protected from
burglary were the sanctity and security of occupancy and the dwelling place." State v.
Pitts, 728 P.2d113, 115 (Utah1986).
Utah's statute defines "dwelling" as "a building which is usually occupied by a
person lodging in the building at night, whether or not a person is actually present." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-201. The phrase, "which is usually occupied by a person lodging in the
building at night" modifies the word "building." In other words, the building itself has to
be one which is usually occupied by sleeping people. See State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 662
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), The phrase does not imply the building's actual use, otherwise, the
burglary of any structure could be converted to a second degree felony if a person in fact
happened to sleep there. For example, if a burglar broke into a warehouse, or a storage
shed, and a person was actually sleeping inside, then his crime would become a second
degree felony rather than a third, even though those structures clearly are not "usually
occupied by a person lodging." The statute's enhancements cannot turn on the mere
presence of a person—rather the statute turns on the traditional use of the structure at
issue.
In Cox, the defendant entered an unoccupied cabin and took some hunting bows.
Id. at 657-58. He argued that the unoccupied cabin was not a dwelling under the burglary
statute. Id. at 662. This Court said that the "usually occupied" portion of the statute
11
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"refers to the purpose for which the structure is used. If the structure is one in which
people typically stay overnight, it fits within the definition of dwelling under the burglary
statute." Id. at 662 (emphasis added). The Court further opined the purpose behind a
second degree burglary statute:
Likewise, our second degree burglary statute is intended to protect people while in
places where they are likely to be living and sleeping overnight, as opposed to
protecting property in buildings such as stores, business offices, or garages.
Id. (emphasis added). In Cox, the fact that no one was at the cabin that evening was
irrelevant to the analysis, since cabins are structures in which people ordinarily live and
sleep overnight. Id.
In State v. McNearney, 2011 UT App 4, 246 P.3d 532, this Court held that a
never-occupied structure, a completed house in which no person ever lived, did not
constitute a dwelling under the burglary statute. Id. at ^f 11. This Court rejected the trial
court's conclusion that the analysis depended on the typical use of the structure itself:
We disagree with the district court's conclusion that Cox made a structure's type,
or the purpose for which it was built, the determining factor in applying the
dwelling definition. To the contrary, Cox spoke of "the purpose for which the
structure is used," and whether "the structure is one in which people typically stay
overnight". Thus, the focus under Cox is on the actual use of the particular
structure that is burglarized, not on the usual use of similar types of structures.
[S]ee also State v. Cates, 2000 UT App 256, para. 4 (mem.) (holding that a
camping trailer rented for the fall deer hunt "was equipped for overnight lodging,
and was, when rented and parked, 'usually occupied by a person lodging therein at
night'"). Although Cox made clear that continuous and current occupation is not
needed, it did not address the fact situation here.
Id. at Tf 9 (internal citations omitted). In McNearney, the home, although it was the type of
building that typically would house overnight guests, did not qualify as a dwelling since
12
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it was not being, and had not been, used as an overnight dwelling. Id. at ^ 10. This Court
reasoned that the empty house was more like a store, business office, or garage. Id.
Taken together, these two cases stand for two general propositions: 1) if a building
has been occupied, and it is a typical structure in which people are housed overnight, then
the fact that it is not occupied does not remove it from the category of dwelling under the
burglary statute; 2) if a building is a typical structure in which people are housed
overnight, but it has never been occupied, then it does not fit the definition of dwelling.
However, neither of these propositions affects whether a church constitutes a
dwelling for purposes of the statute. First, a church is not a typical structure in which
people are housed overnight. Some might assume that many priests live in their churches,
however, this is not the case. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rectory (last checked June
3, 2011). Catholic clerics typically live in rectories or presbyteries and not in the church
itself. Id. In Protestant faiths, the priest will live in a vicarage, presbytery, parsonage,
manse, or pastorium. Id. See also http://w^av.wisegeekxom/what"iS"a~rectory.htm ("A
rectory is a residence maintained for the use of a parish priest. Traditionally, priests have
been reassigned frequently to new churches in many Christian denominations, and the
Church maintains residences for their use as a job benefit. Otherwise, a priest would be
forced to find a new residence with each change of job") (last checked June 3, 2011). It is
extremely rare, in any religious tradition, for persons to live at the church itself. See id.
(rectories "are still widely used around the world today to house priests and other
religious officials"); see also Sizemore, 272 A.2d at 827 ("a church is not a dwelling
13
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house"). The only exception for this would be monasteries or abbeys, which clearly
would constitute dwellings under the statute since clerics live full time at these buildings.
See http://en.wikipedia:orgAviki/Monasteiy (last checked June 3, 2011).
Second, the fact that this church was the full-time dwelling place of one individual
does not affect the matter, since the structure itself, a church, is not one typically used as
a dwelling. In Cox, this Court said the second degree felony was intended to protect
people "in places where they are likely to be living and sleeping overnight, as opposed to
protecting property in buildings such as stores, business offices, or garages." Cox, 826
P.2d at 662 (emphasis added). Ms. Camacho's actual use of a small portion of the
property as her actual residence does not automatically make this a second degree
burglary, since the church itself was not the type of structure typically used for overnight
residence. Additionally, Mr. Francis never entered, or remotely came close to residential
portion of the church. Mr. Camacho lived in a small bedroom in the basement. Mr.
Francis was found upstairs in the church portion of the building and was never seen, nor
heard, to come downstairs.
The policy reasons behind an actual dwelling distinction have merit. Since at
common law, burglary was defined as an invasion on the dwelling places of individuals,
the enhancement is designed to penalize those who would break into people's homes.
Those who break into warehouses, stores, churches or garages are not likely to terrorize
any inhabitants. The key is the focus on the burglar's intent. If a burglar chooses to break
into a building in which property might be found, he should be punished with a third
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degree felony. However, if a burglar choses to break into a structure in which people are
(or are typically) residing, then he runs a greater risk or terrorizing people in their homes
or dwelling places. It is this greater risk of danger and terrorization that merits the
punishment of a second degree felony.
Additionally, as already mentioned, a store, business office, or garage, all
structures that this Court has said are not dwellings under the statute, could automatically
be converted to "dwellings" if a person actually slept overnight there, such as a security
guard or caretaker. To make the crime dependent on the status of an overnight guest,
rather than the criminal intent of the perpetrator, would unfairly and unequally create
different classes of burglars. One burglar who breaks into a store with no overnight guest
would be guilty of third degree burglary, while another who breaks into a store, which
happens to have an overnight caretaker, would be guilty of second degree burglary. Such
a distinction appears to violate equal protection of the United States and Utah
Constitutions since it does not apply equally to all similarly situated defendants.
In this case, since churches are not the type of structures that typically house
residents or guests, there is an extreme unlikelihood that a burglar would terrorize a
sleeping occupant. The statute, therefore, focuses the gradation on structures that
typically occupy overnight guests and have actually occupied them. In this case, the
church was actually occupied, but it was not the type of structure that typically occupies
people overnight.
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Defendant submits that in order to be convicted of second degree burglary, both
elements need to be met for a structure to become a dwelling: 1) the structure needs to
typically occupy overnight guests and 2) the structure has to actually have been occupied
previously. Since the first element is not met in this case, the Court incorrectly convicted
Mr. Francis of the second degree felony burglary.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Francis respectfully requests that this Court find that the trial court
erroneously convicted him of second degree burglary since the church did not constitute a
dwelling under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

(?

day of JUKJE

SAMWELsP. NEWT(
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ADDENDUM A
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201, 76-6-202
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76-6-201. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) (a) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft,
trailer, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or
for carrying on business and includes:
(i) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and
(ii) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle,
(b) "Building" does not include a railroad car.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging in the
building at night, whether or not a person is actually present.
(3) "Enter or remain unlawfully" means a person enters or remains in or on any
premises when:
(a) at the time of the entry or remaining, the premises or any portion of the premises
are not open to the public; and
(b) the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises
or any portion of the premises.
(4) "Enter" means:
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor.
(5) "Railroad car":
(a) in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes a sleeping car or any container or
trailer that is on a railroad car; and
(b) includes only a railroad car that is operable and part of an ongoing railroad
operation.
Amended by Chapter 366, 2008 General Session
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76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary who enters or remains unlawfully in a building or
any portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b) theft;
(c) an assault on any person;
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1);
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3);
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or
(g) voyeurism under Section 76-9-702.7.
(2) Burglary is a third degree felony unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which
event it is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed in
Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while in the
building.
Amended by Chapter 78, 2011 General Session
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